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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARGARET B. HALL,
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff/Appellant,

*
*

v.
*
*

PROCESS INSTRUMENTS AND
CONTROL, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Defendant/Appellee.

*

Appeal No. 920332-CA

*

Priority 16

Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully petitions the Court
for a rehearing.
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE A DETERMINATION THAT THE
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WAS "INTEGRATED" AND IT WAS NOT PROPER FOR
THIS COURT TO INFER THAT IT DID.
In its Opinion dated December 28, 1993, this Court affirmed
the trial courtf s holding that the parol evidence rule rendered
inadmissible Mrs. Hall's testimony that the parties never
intended that she would go to work for Defendant under the
Employment Agreement.

The Court explained as follows:

The trial court ... found, after reviewing evidence of the
contract's integration, that the terms of the employment
agreement appeared to be "complete and certain." After reviewing the
employment agreement at issue, we agree. The employment
agreement unambiguously provides that Mrs. Hall agreed to
work for Process for a period of three years at a monthly
compensation of $1000. There is no mention in the contract
of alimony, nor is Mrs. Hall's agreement to work for

Process qualified in any way. In addition, Mr. Hall testified that
the parties intended this agreement to be a valid and binding employment
agreement.
Opinion at p. 4 (emphasis added).

Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court's holding in regard
to the parol evidence issue on the grounds that the Employment
Agreement appears to be complete and certain and that Mr. Hall
testified that "the parties intended this agreement to be a valid
and binding employment contract."
Mrs. Hall respectfully submits that in affirming the trial
court's application of the parol evidence rule the Court has
failed to properly apply the well settled law of this state.
In Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985), the
Supreme Court recognized that the parol evidence rule has a very
narrow application.

Before the rule may be applied to exclude

otherwise admissible evidence, a court must first determine
whether the writing was intended by the parties to be an
integration.

Id.

In other words, a court must first make a

determination that the parties intended for the writing to represent their full and

complete agreement

Colonial leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const.,

731 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1986).
In the case at bar, the trial court did not make the
required threshold finding that the parties int€inded for the
Employment Agreement to represent their "full and complete

agreement.H

What the trial court did find was that the terms of the

Employment Agreement were "clear and unambiguous and appear to be
complete and certain." (R. 00171).

In making its determination as to whether the Employment
Agreement was intended to be the full and complete agreement
2

between the parties, however, the trial court was not entitled to
simply look at the face of the document to see if it appeared to
be complete and certain.

Union Bank, supra at 665.

To the

contrary, the trial court was required to specifically "determine
as a question of fact whether the parties did in fact adopt [the
writing] as the final and complete expression of their bargain."
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972).
As the Union Bank Court recognized:
What appears to be a complete and binding integrated
agreement may be a ... joke, a sham . . . Such
invalidating causes need not and commonly do not appear
on the face of the writing.
707 P.2d at 665 (emphasis added).
This Court appears to have inferred that the trial court did
make a determination that the Employment Agreement was an
integration based upon the trial court's finding that "Plaintiff
was allowed to introduce parole (sic) evidence, subject to
exclusion, in order to attempt to establish that the agreement
was not either an integration or a partially integrated
contract." (R.00172).

Mrs. Hall respectfully submits that such

an inference was not proper.

The trial court was required to

make specific, detailed findings on all material issues,
including what has turned out to be the central issue in this
case: whether the Employment Agreement was intended to represent
the full and complete agreement of the parties.

See, e.g., Acton

v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)(findings should be
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose steps by
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which ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached);
Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)(trial court
should make findings on all material issues tried by the
parties); and Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P. 2d 1336, 1338-39 (Utah
1979)(findings are not sufficient to support judgment until the
trial court has found on all material issues raised by the
pleadings).
Furthermore, the

If

[f]ailure of the trial court to make

findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the
facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.1"

Acton,

supra at 999 (quoting from Kinkella, supra at 236). There is no
question that the facts in the record of this case are not clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding that the
Employment Agreement was integrated and, therefore, subject to
the parol evidence rule1.

x

Not only did Mrs. Hall testify that the Employment
Agreement was not intended to be the parties1 full and complete
agreement, but Mr. Hall and his attorney both testified that it
was not the full and complete agreement. (Trial Tr. at p. 64,
lines 8-22; and p. 119, lines 13-23). Furthermore, after Mrs.
Hall and Mr. Hall had both testified with respect to their
intent, the trial court ridiculed Defendant's argument that the
parties actually expected Mrs. Hall to go to work for Mr. Hall.
(Trial Tr. at p. 72, lines 14-17; p. 73, lines 3-4; p. 74, lines
9-20).
4

Accordingly, Mrs. Hall respectfully requests that this case
be remanded to the trial court with instruction for the entry of
specific findings on the issue of whether or not the parties
intended for the Employment Agreement to represent their full and
complete agreement.
II. MR. TURLEYfS TESTIMONY WOULD CLEARLY HAVE BEEN RELEVANT TO
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF THE "INTEGRATION" ISSUE.
In footnote 2 of its Opinion, the Court summarily dismisses
Mrs. Hall's argument that the trial court abused its discretion
in not admitting Mr. Brent Turleyfs testimony that Mr. Hall once
offered him a salaried position with Defendant, where Mr. Turley
would not actually have had to work, in lieu of a down payment
for the purchase of Mr. Turleyfs home.

The Court explains as

follows:
Given the trial courtf s determination that the terms of
the employment agreement were clear and unambiguous,
there was no need for evidence regarding Mr. Hall's
intent in drafting this contract. Therefore, the trial
court's decision to exclude Turley's testimony on
grounds of relevance was a legitimate exercise of
discretion.
Again, Mrs. Hall respectfully submits that the Court has
failed to properly apply the relevant law.
In making its determination as to whether the Employment
Agreement was intended to represent the "full and complete"
agreement between the parties, i.e., whether it was an
"integration", the trial court was required to consider all relevant
evidence,

parol and written.

Union Bank, supra at 665

("Protection against judicial enforcement of writings that appear
5

to be binding integrations but in fact are not lies in the
provision that all relevant evidence is admissible on the
threshold issue of whether the writing was adopted by the parties
as an integration of their agreement.

This appears to be so even

if the writing clearly states it to be a complete and final
statement of the parties1 agreement"); Eie v. St. Benedictfs
Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981)("Whether a document was
or was not adopted as an integration may be proved by any
relevant evidence").
There is no question that Mr. Turleyfs testimony would have
been relevant to the question of whether the parties intended for
the Employment Agreement to represent their full and complete
agreement.

As the Court recognizes, Mr. Turley would have

testified that Mr. Hall had attempted to use an employment
contract with his company (containing terms virtually identical
to those at issue in the case at bar, including that Mr. Turley
would not be required to go to work for Mr. Hall's company) as
the down payment on the purchase of Mr. Turley's home.

In other

words, Mr. Turley would have testified that on at least one other
occasion Mr. Hall had attempted to use an employment contract
with his company as consideration for the payment of his own
personal obligations.

This testimony would clearly have had a

tendency to make it more probable that the consideration promised
and given by Mrs. Hall for Defendant's obligations under the
Employment Agreement was not her promise to go to work for
Defendant (as indicated on the face of the Employment Agreement),
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but, rather, was her promise to forego her claim to alimony in
the divorce proceedings simultaneously taking place between
herself and Mr. Hall.
By definition, then, Mr. Turley's testimony would have been
relevant to the issue of whether the parties intended for the
Employment Agreement to represent their "full and complete
agreement."

Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Therefore,

because the trial court was required to consider all relevant
evidence in making the determination as to whether the Employment
Agreement was an integration, Mrs. Hall respectfully submits that
it is clear that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to admit Mr. Turleyfs testimony.
Accordingly, Mrs. Hall requests that this case be remanded
to the trial court and that the trial court be instructed to hear
and consider Mr. Turley?s testimony in making its determination
on the issue of whether the Employment Agreement was intended to
represent the full and complete agreement between the parties.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Mrs. Hall respectfully requests
that her Petition for Rehearing be granted.

Mrs. Hall further

requests that, upon rehearing, this case be remanded to the trial
court with instructions for the entry of specific findings on the
issue of whether or not the Employment Agreement was intended to
represent the full and complete agreement between the parties and
with instructions that Mr. Turley's testimony be heard and
considered in that regard.
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DATED this / //

day of January, 1994,

tt B. Mitchell
torney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, counsel for Petitioner certifies that this Petition
for Rehearing is presented in good faith And not for delay.

/Scjbtt B. Mitchell
/ Attorney for Petitioner
MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that two copies of the
foregoing were mailed on the above date via first class U.S.
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
James A. Mclntyre, Esq.,
360 East 4500 South, Siiite 3
Salt Lake City, Utah #4307
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